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ABSTRACT
Robots state of insecurity is onstage. There is an emerging concern about major robot vulnerabilities
and their adverse consequences. However, there is still a considerable gap between robotics and
cybersecurity domains. For the purpose of filling that gap, the present technical report presents
the Robotics CTF (RCTF), an online playground to challenge robot security from any browser.
We describe the architecture of the RCTF and provide 9 scenarios where hackers can challenge
the security of different robotic setups. Our work empowers security researchers to a) reproduce
virtual robotic scenarios locally and b) change the networking setup to mimic real robot targets. We
advocate for hacker powered security in robotics and contribute by open sourcing our scenarios.
.
1 INTRODUCTION
The robotics landscape is rapidly evolving. Robots are spreading and will soon be everywhere. Systems traditionally
employed in industry are being replaced by collaborative robots, and an increasing amount of professional and con-
sumer robots are introduced in people’s daily activities. Following Personal Computers (PCs) and smartphones, robots
are called to be the next technological revolution. Withal, robot cybersecurity is being largely underestimated, since
safety cannot be granted without security [1].
Over the last decade, the domains of security and cybersecurity have been substantially democratized, attracting in-
dividuals to many sub-areas within security assessment. According to recent technical reports summarizing hacker’s
activity in different sectors [2, 3], most security researchers are currently reporting vulnerabilities in websites (70.8%)
or mobile phones (smartphones, 5.6%), and there is only a marginal contribution to emerging technologies such as
Internet of the Things (IoT) devices (2.6%).
To date, only some pioneering offensive security studies [4, 5] have yet published relevant data about robotics’ state-
of-insecurity, but it seems to be an emerging field of research. We believe that the main reasons for this lag have
been twofold. In a first aspect, robot security is a complex subject from a technological perspective which requires an
interdisciplinary array of backgrounds, including security researchers, roboticists, software engineers and hardware
engineers. In a second aspect, there are few guidelines or tools, and little formal documentation to assess robot
security[6, 7]. However, recent contributions have shed some light on the need of taking into account systematic
security on robot deployments, inter alia [8] [9].
Furthermore, some of the components of modern robotics such as the Robot Operating System[10] (ROS, and its
second version ROS 2.0) have been developed as research platforms, and were purposefully developed without any
security concerns. Some recent work demonstrated that robots powered by ROS are deployed revealing major vulner-
abilities and flaws or simply left unprotected[11]. As the current state of ROS security is under question by the hacker
and researcher community, there have been laudable but discrete efforts among the roboticists by adopting early secu-
rity implementations. Through projects like SROS[12] or Secure ROS, other available research works have dealt with
hardening particular aspects of ROS [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. But, overall, those have been poorly explored
in the practice. We believe that the robotics community and the ROS community could both greatly benefit from an
integrative collaborative effort in an offensive security approach for robotics.
In an attempt to raise awareness around robot security, in this paper, we present the Robotics CTF (RCTF), an online
playground that invites white-hat-hackers to challenge robot security easily. The Robotics CTF is designed to be an
online game, available 24/7, launchable through any web browser and designed to learn robot hacking step by step. In
the following section we discuss the architecture of the RCTF and introduce some of the basic available scenarios.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous work and in particular, the Capture
the Flag competitions for hackers. Section 3 presents Alias Robotics’ Robotics CTF and Section 4 presents paper
outline and future remarks.
2 PREVIOUS WORK
In the field of cybersecurity, Capture The Flag (CTF) competitions are designed as the outdoor game and computer
game counterparts (e.g. Unreal Tournament, Counter Strike, etc). A flag is hidden somewhere over an scenario and
teams or individuals attempt to capture it, scoring points accordingly. The flags consist of secret data and the player
needs to exploit weaknesses present in code or binaries to capture it.
Games start by opening the problem environment to the hacker or team of hackers. Most commonly, different strategies
are suitable to reach the flag, which gives raise to develop different tactics in what is known as the ”Jeopardy” game
mode. Under some conditions, there are ”defensive” and ”offensive” endeavours within the game (”attack/defense”),
a mix of both or even other scopes, such as ”King of the Hill” in which the control of a vulnerable entity is disputed
over different hackers participating.
In the conventional CTF conception, the ”flag” itself can be a virtual flag or an abstract goal. Id est, the target can be
perceivable or hidden, depending on the scenario and the scope of the game. Under some conditions, the ”flag” can
be unknown, so that the player needs to develop a particular awareness and sharpen her/his perception of the Capture
The Flag environment looking for unusual objects, aspects or behaviours. Other creative designs of CTFs mix creative
story lines to engage the hackers into a story oriented to solve an array of problems that are presented into a story
gameplay. The overall objective of CTFs is to score over the opponent(s), by achieving completion of tasks faster, for
a longer duration or more effectively. Table 1 shows different historical use cases and objectives of Capture The Flag
competitions.
CTF ”gaming” techniques are propitious for initiation of new security exercises, displaying of novel pentesting capa-
bilities in the hacker community, challenging novel targets of environment or emphasizing upon a particular security
aspect [22]. CTFs can be useful for educating audiences ad hoc and helps develop novel security skills. In capture the
flag environments hackers, from experts to beginners, can show their capabilities of lateral thinking competing against
other hackers, getting credit accordingly in the ranking of the player community. These new competences enable
white-hat or ethical hackers to learn and identify new vulnerabilities, pinpointing them, which allows the owner of the
system become aware of those before a third party with malicious intentions finds and exploits them.
To date, CTF competitions have been designed in most facets of IT. There are some extremely well known CTFs
such as DEFCON’s [23], the international capture the flag competition (iCTF) [24], DARPA’s Cyber Grand Challenge
[25] and even dozens of successful companies devoted to create CTFs in the most creative fashions, which includes
the most up to date aesthetics and state of the art front-end developments. Figure 1 illustrates real snapshots several
relevant CTF competitions in the international panorama, each of which is adapted to a particular scenario with a
unique security focus, as explained in Table 1.
Inspired by the state of the art, our research found out that, to the best of our knowledge, no CTF has focused or ever
covered robotics as the leitmotif. Additionally, we believe that the CTF approach could be a very powerful and useful
tool to help securing robots. We aim to engage security researchers and offensive security specialists into the largely
unexplored robotics landscape.
3 ROBOTICS CTF (RCTF)
Motivated by the growing insecurity in the field of robotics and the lack of security countermeasures adopted by robot
manufacturers, our team is proud to introduce the first Robotics Capture The Flag game: the Robotics CTF (RCTF).
The RCTF has been designed to be an online playground, available 24/7 and available through any browser from
anywhere in the world, to learn robot hacking step by step. White-hat hacker audience is invited to test, challenge,
learn and interact with state of the art of robot environments, from an educational perspective and with robot security
as the final goal. Gradually, the accomplishments during the RCTF program enable the ethical hacker to acquire the
competences to assess robot security.
To play the RCTF, a user needs to provide a valid e-mail address and accept the terms of use. In addition, each hacker
is kindly asked to behave decorously and to not act beyond the purpose of the gamification.
Alias Robotics’ RCTF consists on an array of serial scenarios that hackers have to successfully complete as fast and
accurately as possible, in order to proceed to the next scenario. With each completion, the successful robot hacker will
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Table 1: Capture The Flag (CTF) methodologies and types.
Platform
(Site)
Type Performer Objective
NON-SECURITY ORIENTED CTFS
Outdoor game Attack/Defense Teams Find and capture a given physical flag in
an outdoor environment and Protect your
teams’ flag
Unreal Tour-
nament
Attack/Defense Teams of players
(Humans or bots)
Grab other teams flag to your own base,
without being killed on the way, and pro-
tect yours against members of the other
team
Counter
Strike
Attack/Defense Teams of players
(Humans or bots)
Idem
SECURITY ORIENTED CTFS
DEFCON’s
CTF
Attack/Defense Teams On custom services, attack other’s, patch
and protect your own with secret scoring
system
iCTF Attack/Defense Teams Maintain a set of services so that they
remain available and uncompromised
throughout the contest and attack others’
DARPA’s
CGC
System and develop-
ment oriented
Teams Automated hacker systems are programed
by teams to perform an array of security
tasks
iHacklabs
(classic)
Jeopardy Hackers / Teams Complete challenges in web, reverse enge-
nieering, forensics and criptography
Hacknet Jeopardy Individual Following ”Bit’s” story, the hacker needs
to solve problems on the go
NetKotH King of the Hill Hackers/Teams The contestants must gain access to a chal-
lenge machine which may contain multiple
vulnerabilities. Once they are on the chal-
lenge machine, they must plant their team
tag where the ScoreBot can see it.
Hack the Box Jeopardy Hackers Contains several dynamic challenges.
Some of them simulate real world scenar-
ios and some appertain to CTF style of
challenges
FACEBOOK
(Educational
CTF)
Jeopardy and King of
the Hill (Supported)
Hacker/Teams Design your own CTF environments and
competition
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(a) DEFCON’s CTF (b) DARPA’s CGC
(c) iHackLabs CTF (d) FB CTF template model
Figure 1: Snapshots of available Capture the Flag competitions
be provided with a password that allows him/her to proceed to the next. The robot hacker can review her/his position
on the ranking table and compare results against the rest of the hackers in the RCTF community.
Robotics CTF is designed to provide hackers with a full experience of the security landscape in robotics. Integrated
in our webpage, the platform allows to learn using tools such as ROS, is compatible with other hacking tools and
provides robot simulation through Gazebo [26] as shown in Figure 2. The first scenarios are education-oriented and,
by achieving those, the hacker will gain basic know-how for the forecoming challenges. The scenarios depicted in
RCTF (Table 2) are fictitious and do not have real-world counterparts, but do certainly reflect similarities with current
real platforms in robotics.
Figure 2: Shows a snapshot of Robotics CTF (RCTF) Scenario 4 with a virtual collaborative robot (UR10) and Prudencio, wearing
his Alias Robotics T-shirt. Imprudently, he does not realize that his UR10 is under the control of a third party and goes too close.
The objective of this scenario is to hit ”Pruden” with UR10 , which will unlock the flag and allow the robot hacker to proceed to
the next level.
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Figure 3: Overview of the architecture of the RCTF infrastructure and Scenarios
3.1 ARCHITECTURE
Several approaches were evaluated for the RCTF architecture. A trade-off between several aspects had to be
considered. Mainly: speed of deployment, ability to design complex scenarios, performance of the scenario, security
and containment of the infrastructure (together with the environment itself). The evaluation process considered
alternatives regarding multi-container environments and virtual machine-based environments. For the final design, a
hybrid architecture between the two mentioned approaches has been adopted. RCTF uses containers for the scenario
environments and virtual machines, as single units, for deployment and containment. The architecture of the Alias
Robotics’ RCTF is summarized in Figure 3.
As pictured in Figure 3, a web based application is used in conjunction with a hypervisor that orchestrates the creation
of a series of scenarios for the robot hackers. The RCTF scenarios consist of self contained Virtual Machines (VMs)
that host the containers that form the scenarios. This operation allows for the creation of complex scenarios, in which
several ROS machines can coexist in a given simulated network environment. In order to improve the deployment
speed and operational cost, linked clones based on Logical Volume Manager are being used, which allow the scenarios
to be launched over certain timespans of less than a second and take little storage.
To avoid compromising the security and the stability of our Robotics CTF, we decided to use VMs as containers of the
different scenarios. Each scenario is associated with an individual VM that communicates with the web server through
two sockets, one for the terminal connection and one for the simulation (Gazebo). To facilitate the construction and
reproduction of results, each scenario (VM) is built using Docker with one or several instances. In other words, our
architecture comprises Virtual Machines that embed containers. By doing this, we allow security researchers to 1)
reproduce the RCTF scenarios locally and 2) study different networking setups.
The benefits of our approach are twofold. First, by giving hackers the chance to run scenarios locally, we allow them to
explore flaws without the restrictions of remote servers. Second, while the proposed scenarios aim to be as realistic as
possible, there’s still a gap when compared to real robotic setups. By containerizing the scenarios, we allow security
researchers to deploy the challenges in a variety of networking setups. This allows to mimic real robots, further
enhancing the possibilities of detecting more flaws.
Our approach also simplifies the deployment of new environments, as all the initialization is contained on each envi-
ronment, without the need of a central point of orchestration, as in traditional multi-container Docker environments.
From the deployment perspective, each scenario is treated as a single deployment unit, fully independent of its com-
plexity. Moreover, the RCTF approach simplifies the migration between different orchestration and cloud platforms,
and minor work is required in the management plane of the cloud provider. After scenarios are created, the robot
hacker may be provided with a terminal connection to some of the containers, in addition to, when appropriate, a
connection to the Gazebo Web environment.
6
Technical report
Table 2: RCTF Scenario briefing.
Scenario Weakness Description
1 Cleartext Transmission
of Sensitive Information,
CWE-319
The robot hacker can play with the Robot Operating System and its
publisher/subscriber architecture.
2 Cleartext Transmission
of Sensitive Information,
CWE-319
The whitehat can experiment with some of the ROS2.0 functionalities,
and see the differences and similarities between ROS and ROS2. Espe-
cially, is noted that not setting up the security features of ROS2 lever-
ages to the same weaknesses as in ROS1.
3 Usage of weak, well known
credentials
The whitehat becomes a robot-hacker and needs to prove basic knowl-
edge of ROS and basic knowledge of the series of movies Jurassic Park
to make a node publish the password somewhere.
4 Undefined safety boundaries Everyone cares about robot safety. But there is no safety without se-
curity. Gazebo visualization allows us to see ”Prudencio” wearing an
Alias Robotics t-shirt going too close to a hacked UR10.
5 Cleartext Transmission
of Sensitive Information,
CWE-319
ROS traffic is not readable from an unauthorized actor, or is it?
6 CWE-78: Improper Neutral-
ization of Special Elements
used in an OS Command
A bug on the script allows performing arbitrary calls to system com-
mands. Is it exploitable?
7 coming soon! The robot hacker is invited to try an Alias Robotics’ crafted offensive
tool.
8 CWE-798: Use of Hard-
coded Credentials
The robot hacker could search in compiled ROS application code for
hardcoded credentials used during execution.
9 CWE-547: Use of Hard-
coded, Security-relevant
Constants
The hacker might be able to modify binaries in order to alter the ex-
ecution and compromise the confidentiality and privacy of protected
sources.
Alias Robotics has developed a series of RCTF scenarios, with a complexity that goes in crescendo from requiring
a very basic understanding of robot frameworks such as ROS and ROS2, to being familiar with the more complex
use of a variety of hacking tools. Table 2 provides insight about the original scenarios developed by our team. These
scenarios can be tested online at http://rctf.aliasrobotics.com
3.2 CONTRIBUTING
In an attempt to contribute with the security community, we are open sourcing the scenarios at https://github.
com/aliasrobotics/rctf-list. We envision that as new scenarios become available, the sources will remain
at this repository and only a subset of them will be pushed to our web servers http://rctf.aliasrobotics.
com for experimentation. We invite the community of roboticists and security researchers to play online and get a
robot hacker rank.
We also invite security researchers to share their scenarios with the RCTF community, with the chance of potentially
integrating them on the RCTF game. We gladly accept contributions through Pull Requests at https://github.
com/aliasrobotics/rctf-list. Therein, the procedure of RCTF scenario submission is summarized, which
require a short description of the goal of each scenario.
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4 REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we introduce the Robotics CTF (RCTF), a platform for robot hacking. We propose a robot hacking
gamification environment, accessible from any browser, 24/7 and anywhere in the world. We describe the architecture
of our platform and provide exemplary scenarios that can be customized by hackers to meet their target platforms.
Moreover, we highlight that our approach allows security researchers to a) reproduce scenarios locally and b) change
the networking setup to mimic their real targets.
We invite the whole security researcher community to play the RCTF and contribute with new scenarios of their own.
We also warn society about the increasing relevance of robot vulnerabilities and advocate in favour of the creation of
a strong robot ethical hacker community. Ultimately, we claim that robot security could benefit greatly from hacker
powered security and contribute by open sourcing the existing scenarios created by our team.
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